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Abstract
We study the impacts of investment in public capital on equity and
efficiency. Taking into account stylized facts on wealth accumulation,
we model agent heterogeneity through differences in saving behavior,
income source and time preference. We find that in the long run, public
investment is Pareto-improving and that it reduces inequality in wealth,
welfare and income at the same time, if it is financed by a capital tax.
Consumption tax financing is also Pareto-improving but distribution-
neutral. Only for labor tax financing, a trade-off between equity and
efficiency occurs. Additionally we find that agents differ in their pre-
ferred tax rates. The results for capital and labor tax financing are valid
for both, the case of decreasing and constant returns to accumulable fac-
tors.
JEL classification: E21, E6, H23, H31, H54
Keywords: Public capital, infrastructure, distribution, inequality, heteroge-
neous saving
*Corresponding author. Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate
Change (MCC), Torgauer Str. 12-15, 10829 Berlin. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact
Research (PIK), Technical University of Berlin, Email: klenert@pik-potsdam.de, Phone: +49
(0)30-3385-537-253, Fax: +49 (0)30-3385-537-102 .
†Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Technical
University of Berlin, Email: mattauch@mcc-berlin.net
‡Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Pots-
dam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Technical University of Berlin, Email:
edenhofer@pik-potsdam.de
§Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Mercator Research Institute on
Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Email: lessmann@pik-potsdam.de
1
1 Introduction
Public investment in infrastructure has recently received much attention as an
attractive option for accomplishing two main objectives of economic policy:
Promoting efficiency and growth as well as reducing inequality in wealth. Ev-
idence from the empirical literature suggests that investment in infrastructure
can have a decreasing effect on inequality (Calderón and Servén, 2014a), while
enhancing growth at the same time (Calderón and Servén, 2014b). The authors
assert that for both relationships, little is known about the magnitude of the ef-
fects and the underlying mechanisms.
In this article, we confirm that public investment can enhance equality, but
show that, in the long run, this depends strongly on the financing mechanism:
Capital tax financing can both promote inequality reduction in wealth, welfare
and income, and enhance the total level of these variables, when its revenue is
spent on public investment. Financing public capital with a consumption tax
enhances the efficiency but leaves the level of inequality virtually unchanged.
The result on consumption tax financing is, to our knowledge, novel in the
literature, as is the result that inequality in wealth and welfare is reduced if
public investment is financed by a capital tax. In our analysis, the frequently
discussed trade-off between equity and efficiency only occurs for the case of
labor tax-financed public investment, which indeed increases inequality in all
indicators.
Additionally, the optimal tax level for each household is determined and
it is shown that agents differ in their preferred tax rates. This is an exten-
sion of the result by Barro (1990) that there is a trade-off between providing
productive public investment and its distortionary financing, to the case of het-
erogeneous households. Nevertheless, up to a certain rate of all taxes, total
levels of wealth, welfare and income are always enhanced, making all agents
better off, and thus constituting a Pareto improvement. Our results rest on an
approach of modeling household heterogeneity that is based on stylized facts
about income sources, saving behavior and time preferences.
Previous theoretical work comes to ambiguous conclusions on the distri-
butional effects of infrastructure investment: Alesina and Rodrik (1994) show
that inequality-reducing public investment always decreases the efficiency. In
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) it is found that in the long run, the impact
of public investment in a productivity-enhancing knowledge stock is neutral
on the distribution. The authors consequently argue that there is no equity-
efficiency trade-off in the long run when it comes to public investment. Chat-
terjee and Turnovsky (2012) find that labor and consumption tax financing
increase income inequality in the long run, while capital tax financing can de-
crease income inequality. Regarding the distribution of wealth and welfare,
they show that public investment always enhances inequality in the long run,
independent of the financing mechanism.
We attribute these results to the way heterogeneity is introduced: In the
aforementioned studies, agents differ only in their initial capital endowments.
Only Alesina and Rodrik (1994) additionally account for differences in income
sources.
A model with these types of heterogeneity assumptions however is not able
to reproduce the observed wealth distribution (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008; De
Nardi and Yang, 2014). “[F]or many purposes, the representative-consumer
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model should be abandoned in favor of a model that matches key microeco-
nomic facts” (Carroll, 2000a; p. 110). Here we comply with this request: By
departing from the standard assumptions on heterogeneity our results on con-
sumption tax financing of infrastructure differ from previous studies, as well
as the results on capital tax financing, when inequality in wealth and welfare
is considered.
In our model we account for the following economic facts:1 Rich house-
holds have been shown to save in a dynastic fashion, while households in the
middle income cohorts exhibit more of a life-cycle saving behavior (Attana-
sio, 1994; Dynan et al., 2004; Browning and Lusardi, 1996). Neither motive in
isolation can reproduce the observed wealth distribution (Carroll, 2000b). The
wealthier a household is, the more his income sources shift away from wage
income towards business and capital income and the more likely it is that he
is self-employed (Quadrini, 1997; Diaz-Gimenez et al., 2011; Wolff, 1998).
Lawrance (1991) and Green et al. (1996) demonstrate that wealthier house-
holds have lower rates of time preference. Krusell and Smith (1998) show that
allowing for different time preference rates is a key factor in reproducing the
observed wealth distribution.
We develop a general equilibrium model in which high income households
are characterized by having a dynastic saving behavior and capital income as
their only income source. Middle income households are life-cycle savers,
which split their labor income between current consumption and savings for
retirement. Low income households do not save or even dissave and are thus
omitted.2 Our model is related to the model developed in Michl (2009) and can
also be seen as an extension of the models described in Stiglitz (1969, 2015)
that incorporates optimizing agents. High income households are modeled as
a representative infinitely-lived agent, and the middle income households are
modeled as a representative overlapping-generations agent.3 The model also
allows for agents to differ in their time preference rate. We then calibrate the
model to closely match stylized facts of the U.S. economy. In Mattauch et al.
(2016) we show analytically, for a basic version of the model, that under these
heterogeneity assumptions, capital tax-financed public investment can enhance
productivity while reducing inequality. Here we generalize the basic model,
in order to assess more channels through which public investment affects the
distribution of wealth, welfare and income. We include consumption and labor
taxation as revenue-raising mechanisms, introduce a labor-leisure choice and
model public capital as affecting both production, and utility.4 Due to our
choice of two optimizing agents with distinct saving behavior, our model does
1There are other factors which also influence the wealth distribution but go beyond the scope
of this work: For instance the transmission of human capital within families and the existence
of public insurance systems (De Nardi and Yang, 2014) as well as differences in rates of return
(Guvenen, 2006).
2A stylized way to include the low income households in our model is to include them in
the middle income group. We explore this approach in Appendix E and demonstrate that it does
not change our main results significantly.
3In order to highlight the underlying mechanisms we choose to only look at two extreme
cases of saving behavior: completely altruistic in the case of the infinitely-lived agent, and pure
life-cycle in the case of the overlapping generations agent.
4Since most public goods such as for example infrastructure and health care affect produc-
tivity and utility at the same time, it is crucial to account for both channels to avoid incorrect
conclusions. See Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011) for more details.
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not nest the other approaches mentioned before, but instead complements them
by accounting for stylized facts on heterogeneous saving behavior.
Our article makes two main contributions. First, we demonstrate that intro-
ducing heterogeneity based on empirically observed household behavior has
far-reaching consequences: Depending on its financing mechanism (capital,
consumption or labor taxation), public investment can either have a decreas-
ing, neutral or increasing impact on inequality. Our second contribution is that
our modeling approach yields meaningful results for both endogenous growth
and steady-state convergence and our results do not depend on the assumption
of homogeneous time preference rates across all agents.
Our concept of heterogeneity, the first contribution, allows us to draw the
following conclusions: (i) Higher levels of wealth, welfare and income and a
reduced dispersion of these economic variables across households in the long
run can be achieved by a policy of capital tax-financed public investment. Re-
garding income inequality, this result confirms the study by Chatterjee and
Turnovsky (2012). It differs from their findings when inequality in wealth or
welfare is considered and from the results derived in Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). (ii) Financing public capital through a
consumption tax has virtually no effect on the distribution of these variables
in the long run.5 (iii) By determining the tax level that maximizes each house-
hold’s steady-state utility, we find that households differ in their preferred tax
level. As a consequence of this result, there is no single optimal tax rate when
financing public investment.
Our second contribution is that our results are very robust with regard to
the modeling strategy (see Section 4.2): The results for labor and capital tax
financing remain qualitatively the same for endogenous growth as well as for
steady-state convergence of the model.6 All results hold for a wide range of
heterogeneous time preference rates across households and the model behav-
ior does not change for homogeneous time preference rates. Furthermore the
results remain qualitatively the same if only public capital (as in Barro 1990),
or only private capital (as in Romer 1986), is productivity-enhancing.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines
the model and its calibration. In Section 3 we characterize the model results
for convergence to the steady state. In Section 4.1 we present extensions to
the model such as additional financing mechanisms (lump-sum taxes and gov-
ernment debt) for public investment and the endogenous growth version of the
model. In Section 4.2 we analyze the model’s robustness to variations in the
model assumptions and in parameter values. Section 5 concludes the article.
2 Model
The three most important features of the model are that (i) household hetero-
geneity is modeled through differences in saving behavior and differences in
5Other studies do not consider consumption taxes or find a strong negative effect of con-
sumption tax financing on the distribution in the long run.
6Most theoretical articles on public investment use endogenous growth models based on
Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1997) since the relationship between growth and public invest-
ment is their main focus. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), by contrast, use a model with steady-
state convergence. However, to avoid an indeterminate steady-state wealth distribution, they
assume imperfect capital markets. Our model delivers meaningful results for both approaches
(without assuming imperfect capital markets).
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income sources. High income households whose bequest motive is perfectly
altruistic and who rely only on capital income are modeled as a representa-
tive infinitely-lived agent. Middle income households who save according to
a life-cycle motive are modeled as a representative overlapping-generations
agent with labor and capital income. The households can also differ in their
time preference rate. (ii) Public and private capital are combined in a weighted
product, the composite externality. By varying the weight parameter we can
vary the role capital plays in production: When the weight parameter of private
capital equals one the role of private capital is analogous to the case examined
by Romer (1986). For a weight parameter of private capital equal to zero, pub-
lic capital plays the same role as in the model by Barro (1990). (iii) Public
capital plays a dual role in our model, enhancing both the value of leisure in
the utility function, and total productivity. Since it would not provide us with
additional insights we neglect population growth and assume that the size of
the representative households does not change. Still we account for the fact
that the households are different in size in the calibration of the model (see
Section 2.7).
2.1 The firm
The production sector is modeled as a single representative firm. Labor is
provided by the middle income household only, while both households supply
capital. Production occurs with a Cobb-Douglas production function:
F (Kt ,ht ) = AˆKαt h
1−α
t , Aˆ = AX
β
p,t , 0 < α,β < 1 (1)
with ht = 1− lt being the portion of the total time endowment that middle
income households dedicate to work. The remainder of their time is used for
leisure lt .
Xp,t = Kεt K
1−ε
G,t , with 0 < ε < 1, represents a composite production exter-
nality, modeled as a weighted product of private and public capital. The capital
entering the production function is the sum of the middle income households’
savings from the last period St−1 and the high income households’ capital Kh,t :
Kt = St−1 +Kh,t . (2)
Note that for α + β < 1 the economy converges to a steady state. But if
α + β = 1 and if the ratio of public to private capital remains constant, the
model will display endogenous growth behavior. This can be deduced by an
equivalent of Equation (1):
F (Kt ,ht ) = AK
α+β
t (ht )
1−α
(
KG,t
Kt
)(1−ε )β
.
A representative firm maximizes its profit:
Πt = F (Kt ,ht )− (rt +δK )Kt −wtht
where rt and wt represent the rental rates the firms have to pay to the house-
holds for capital and labor and δk is the depreciation rate of private capital. The
following first-order conditions are obtained:
rt +δK =
∂F (Kt ,ht )
∂Kt
= αA
(
ht
Kt
)1−α
Xβp,t , (3)
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wt =
∂F (Kt ,ht )
∂ht
= (1−α )A
(
Kt
ht
)α
Xβp,t . (4)
2.2 The high income households
The high income households are modeled as a representative infinitely-lived
agent, to which we will also refer as “ILA”. They derive utility from either
consumption Ct or leisure lh, which is fixed for the ILA. We later show in
Section 4.2.2 that the results of this paper are independent from the level of
leisure the high income households receive as long as it remains in a plausible
range (see Table 7). Future utility is discounted by the time preference rate ρh.
Lifetime utility is given by
U =
tfinal
∑
t=0
uILAt ·
1
(1+ρh)t
, (5)
with
uILAt =
(
1
b
)(
Cat +θ (Xu,t lh)
a)( ba ) ,
where a = 1− 1σIntra , with σIntra being the intratemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure and b = 1− 1σInter , with σInter being the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. θ is a weight factor for the leisure term
and Xu,t = K
ϕ
t K
1−ϕ
G,t , with 0 < ϕ < 1, is the composite externality as in the
production sector, but with a different exponent ϕ .
The ILA chooses her levels of consumption Ct and capital accumulation
Kh,t to maximize Equation (5) according to her budget constraint:
Kh,t+1−Kh,t = (1− τK )rtKh,t − (1+ τc)Ct , (6)
where τc represents a consumption and τk a capital income tax. The agent
takes the returns to capital, rt , as well as all taxes as given by the firm and the
government, respectively. Solving the optimization problem yields the follow-
ing intertemporal decision equation (details on the derivation can be found in
the Appendix B): (
∂uILAt−1
∂Ct−1
)
(
∂uILAt
∂Ct
) = 1+ (1− τK )rt
1+ρh
. (7)
2.3 The middle income households
The middle income households are modeled as a representative Diamond-type
overlapping-generations agent, to whom we will also refer as an “OLG” agent
and who lives for just two periods. The duration of each period is thirty years.
In the first period the agent decides how to divide her fixed time endowment
(which is normalized to 1) between work (ht = 1− ly,t) and leisure (ly,t) and how
much of her labor income (wt) she saves for the second period (Equation 9). In
the second period, the savings plus the interests are consumed (see Equation
10). We use the subscript “y” to denote the young (first-period) agent, and “o”
to denote the old (second-period) agent.
The lifetime utility of the OLG agent is given by:
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uOLGt =
1
b
(
Cay,t +θ (Xu,t ly,t )
a) ba + 1
(1+ρm)
1
b
(
Cao,t+1 +θ (Xu,t+1lo)
a) ba , (8)
where lo is the fixed leisure endowment of the old agent. We show in Section
4.2.2 that the level of this parameter does not change the character of the results
as long as it remains in a plausible range. The young agent discounts her own
old age by a factor ρm. The agent chooses ly,t and St to maximize her lifetime
utility subject to the two budget constraints:
(1+ τc)Cy,t = (1− τw)wt (1− lt )−St (9)
(1+ τc)Co,t+1 = (1+ (1− τK )rt+1)St , (10)
where τw is a tax on labor. Solving the optimization problem yields the
equations of the inter- and intratemporal decision problem (details on the deriva-
tion can be found in the Appendix C):(
∂uOLGt
∂Cy,t
)
(
∂uOLGt
∂Co,t+1
) = (1+ (1− τK )rt+1), (11)
(
∂uOLGt
∂Cy,t
)
(
∂uOLGt
∂ ly,t
) = (1+ τc)
(1− τw) ·wt . (12)
2.4 The government
The government levies taxes to finance investment in a public capital stock
KG. Public capital depreciates at the rate δG. The tax level is set exogenously,
which means that the government does not optimize. We nevertheless can find
the preferred tax rates of each agent by comparing their utilities in different
steady states. The government’s budget equation is thus
KG,t+1−KG,t = τK · rt ·Kt + τw ·ht ·wt + τc · (Ct +Cy,t +Co,t )−δGKG,t . (13)
Subsequently, the relative merit of financing public investment by the three
distinct taxes will be compared.
2.5 Equilibrium and the Pasinetti Paradox
For α + β < 1 the system converges to a steady state for all parameter com-
binations evaluated numerically (see Table 1 for the standard calibration and
Table 7 for the parameter ranges evaluated in the sensitivity analysis). In the
following, variables at their steady-state levels are denoted by a tilde. We see
from Equation (7) that in the steady state, the high income households’ rate of
pure time preference determines the interest rate of the aggregate economy r˜:
1+ (1− τK )r˜
1+ρh
= 1⇒ r˜ = ρh
(1− τK ) . (14)
This entails that in our model a form of the Pasinetti (1962) Paradox occurs.
In its original formulation the paradox states that in a Solow model with two
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types of households, one of them only receiving income through capital inter-
ests – the “capitalists” – the steady-state interest rate is solely determined by
the “capitalists” savings rate. Similarly, in our framework the long-run inter-
est rate is only determined by the high income households’ time preference
rate (and the capital tax rate), independent of the high income households’
income sources. The paradox furthermore implies that when middle income
households increase their saving, the high income households’ saving will be
relatively lower. For more details on the Pasinetti Paradox in the context of a
simpler version of this model see Mattauch et al. (2016). Note that the Pasinetti
Paradox does not occur for endogenous growth, since in that case the interest
rate no longer depends only on the time preference rate of the high income
household. The remaining equations that characterize the steady state can be
found in Appendix D.
2.6 Measure of distribution
We take the coefficient of variation σ j with j ∈ [K,U, Inc] as a measure of
dispersion in wealth, welfare and income (see e.g. Ray 1997 for details on in-
equality measures). The cohorts represented by the two agents are of unequal
size (see Chapter 2.7 on calibration), which has to be reflected in the calcu-
lation of the coefficient. In the following N is the total size of both cohorts,
while Nm and Nh stand for the size of the middle and the high income cohort.
The index “pc” marks a per capita variable:
σK =
√
1
N
(
Nm(Spc−µK )2 +Nh(Kh,pc−µK )2
)
µK
,
with µK being the mean:
µK =
NhKh,pc +NmSpc
N
.
2.7 Calibration
We calibrate the model such that in the baseline scenario the high income
households make up five percent of the population, while owning 62 % of total
wealth and the middle income households make up the next 55 % of the pop-
ulation while owning the remaining 38 % of total wealth. These numbers are
chosen to match a study on the wealth distribution in the U.S. (Wolff, 2010).
The model also roughly complies with the fact that 50–60 % of U.S. net worth
accumulation is due to wealth transfers from one generation to another (Gale
and Scholz, 1994). In the baseline scenario a minimal stock of public capital
is already provided through a consumption tax, which is the least distortionary
of the three types of taxes.
The above results use the parameterization displayed in Table 1. All values
are chosen for timesteps of thirty years.
We use the study by Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) as a benchmark
for our calibration. Whenever we deviate from their calibration the reason
lies in the different type of household heterogeneity used in our model: We
model the households such that high income households have a lower time
preference rate than middle income households, in accordance with Lawrance
(1991), Dynan et al. (2004) and Green et al. (1996). Leisure is constant for
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Symbol Parameter Value Value (p.a.)
α Elasticity of capital in production 0.4 –
β Exponent of public capital in production 0.2 –
δG Depreciation of public capital 0.7 4%
δk Depreciation of private capital 0.7 4%
ε Private capital share in Xp,t 0.6 –
ϕ Private capital share in Xu,t 0.6 –
lh, lo Leisure of agents with only capital income 0.71 –
ρh High inc. households’ time preference rate 0.45 1.2%
ρm Middle inc. households’ time preference rate 6 6.7%
σInter Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.4 –
σIntra Intratemporal elasticity of substitution 0.76 –
θ Share of leisure in utility function 1.75 –
Table 1: Standard calibration of the model
agents receiving only capital income, which is true for the old middle income
household and the high income household. These assumptions are analyzed
for their robustness in Section 4.2.2. The parameter ranges in which our results
remain qualitatively the same is given in Table 7.
3 Results
In this section we present the results for the case of decreasing returns to ac-
cumulable factors and thus of convergence to the steady state.We assess the
impact of our assumption of household heterogeneity on the performance of
three revenue-raising mechanisms for public investment: capital income taxa-
tion, labor income taxation and consumption taxation. We analyze the impact
of these policies on wealth, welfare, income, the distribution of these variables
between different households, and on aggregate output. The various policies
are evaluated relative to a scenario in which a basic level of public capital is
supplied by a 2 % consumption tax.
In the long run, investment in public capital can be inequality-decreasing,
distribution-neutral or inequality-increasing, depending on the financing mech-
anism: Capital taxation as a financing option reduces inequality, while a labor
tax increases inequality and consumption taxation has a neutral effect on the
distribution.7 All three financing mechanisms promote efficiency up to a cer-
tain tax level.
Furthermore, by comparing the steady-state utility levels for varied tax
values, we determine the tax level that maximizes each household’s welfare
for each financing mechanism.
The short-run distributional effects can, for some financing mechanisms,
be contrary to the long-run effects: for instance, a labor tax can decrease short-
run wealth inequality even though it is inequality-increasing in the long run. A
consumption tax is almost distribution-neutral in the long run, but has strong
distributional impacts in the short run.
This section is structured as follows: In the first part, Section 3.1, we de-
scribe the effect of each financing mechanism for public capital for the case of
7In Section 4.1 we also consider financing of public capital through government bonds and
lump-sum taxes.
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convergence to the steady state. We discuss the effects of the policy on wel-
fare, capital and income of each agent, as well as on aggregate output and on
the dispersion of wealth, welfare and income. Furthermore, each household’s
welfare-maximizing tax level is determined for each financing mechanism. In
Section 3.1.4 the different financing mechanisms are compared in terms of
their efficiency and equity implications. Finally, in Section 3.2, we describe
the effects of the policies on the transitional dynamics.
3.1 Long-run results
In this section we investigate the long-run effects of increased public invest-
ment for a broad range of exogenously given capital, labor and consumption
tax rates. We write dX to denote the percentage change of the variable X with
respect to the baseline scenario of a 2 % consumption tax.
To avoid a discussion on how to compare aggregate utilities of short-lived
OLG agents to that of infinitely-lived agents, in this section we only consider
steady-state utility levels, to which we will refer as welfare. We denote the tax
levels that maximize output and each agent’s welfare level as τmaxY , τmaxu,ILA and
τmaxu,OLG.
3.1.1 Capital tax
When financing an increase in public capital with a tax on capital income, we
find the following four effects:
1. Dispersion in wealth, welfare and income decreases for rising τk (see
Figure 1 on the left).
2. Output is maximized for a 30 % capital tax.
3. For tax rates up to 64 % the policy is Pareto-improving (see Figure 1 on
the right).
4. Middle income households prefer a higher capital tax rate (40%) than
high income households (30%) (see Figure 1 on the right).
Figure 1: Effects of capital tax-financed public investment on the dispersion of
wealth, welfare and income (left side) and on the welfare of both agents (right
side). The downward spikes in the left figure reflect the points where middle
income households are equal in a certain variable to high income households.
For even higher tax rates the dispersion increases again, but this time the mid-
dle income households are comparatively better off.
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dY(%) duILA(%) duOLG (%) dσK (%) dσu (%) dσInc (%)
τmaxY = 0.3 31.5 53.6 61.5 −10.8 −1.8 −54.2
τmaxu,ILA = 0.3 31.5 53.6 61.5 −10.8 −1.8 −54.2
τmaxu,OLG = 0.4 29.1 51.3 63.2 −16.9 −2.9 −79.1
Table 2: Steady-state effects of a capital tax-financed increase in public spend-
ing. In the column on the left, the levels of capital tax rates which maximize
output and utility of the different agents are given. In the remaining columns
the changes in output, welfare and dispersion are given in percent, as compared
to the baseline.
These results are explained as follows: Since the model has the Pasinetti
property (see also Section 2.5), a capital tax increases the interest rate in the
long run (see Equation 14), high income households reduce their savings and
thus the income and wealth dispersion decreases. For low capital taxes the
public capital stock and with it the composite externality increases, which in-
creases the returns to labor (see Equation 4) and thus further decreases the
dispersion in income.8 These effects combined lead to a larger reduction in
consumption and thus in welfare for high income households than for middle
income households. Thus dispersion in all three variables decreases.9
A Pareto improvement exists because of the positive effect of the compos-
ite externality on utility and production. Whenever the positive effect of public
investment outweighs the negative effect of taxation Pareto improvements are
possible.
3.1.2 Labor tax
A labor tax affects only the middle income households, since the high income
households do not receive any labor income. The effects of labor tax-financed
public capital are displayed in Figure 2. Our main findings are:
1. Dispersion in all three variables increases (see Figure 2 on the left).
2. Output is maximized for a labor tax bigger than 92 %.
3. The policy is Pareto-improving up to more than 92% (see Figure 2 on
the right).
4. Middle income households prefer a lower income tax rate (68%) than
high income households (> 92 %) (see Figure 2 on the right).
The intuition behind these results is as follows: A labor tax solely affects
the middle income households’ income, which increases the income dispersion
strongly. Since the middle income households’ saving decision depends on the
level of the wage income, their savings decrease, which causes the wealth dis-
persion to increase. Labor taxation increases the leisure consumption ratio,
8Some parts of the tax incidence also fall on the middle income households through the
depressing effect a capital tax can have on the wage rate. In our model this effect is offset by
the positive effect of public investment on both factors.
9In the case of a capital tax the labor-leisure decision plays only a minor role: Total leisure
for the middle income households is slightly decreased since the value of leisure increases due
to an increase in the composite externality. The composite externality increases as long as the
increase in public capital offsets the decrease in private capital.
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Figure 2: Effects of labor tax-financed public capital on the dispersion of
wealth, welfare and income (left graph) and on the welfare of both agents
(right graph). The high income households prefer the maximum wage tax rate,
since they do not receive wage income but benefit from public investment. The
tax rate preferred by the middle income households is quite high, which is a
consequence of the current calibration, where the benefits of public investment
outweigh the negative effects of a labor tax up to a tax rate of 68%.
dY(%) duILA(%) duOLG (%) dσK (%) dσu (%) dσInc (%)
τmaxY > 0.92 443.2 98.4 87.8 59.4 7.9 1245
τmaxu,ILA > 0.92 443.2 98.4 87.8 59.4 7.9 1245
τmaxu,OLG = 0.68 276.9 96.7 92.2 43.9 5.3 539.6
Table 3: Steady-state effects of a labor tax-financed increase in public spend-
ing. In the column on the left, the levels of labor tax rates which maximize
output and utility of the different agents are given. In the remaining columns
the changes in output, welfare and dispersion are given in percent, as com-
pared to the baseline. Some values are outside the feasible range of taxes in
our model and are thus marked with a “>” sign.
which can be seen in Equation (C.5). The increasing composite externality has
an opposing effect on the leisure consumption ratio (since a< 0, for σIntra < 1),
which dominates with the current parameterization (specified in Section 2.7),
so leisure decreases. The high income household experiences a stronger in-
crease in welfare due to its non-taxed income and the leisure-enhancing effect
of the composite externality, while the middle income household has reduced
consumption through labor income taxation and reduced leisure, which causes
inequality in welfare also to increase. The mechanism for the Pareto improve-
ment described for the capital tax also applies here, it is even stronger since
labor taxation decreases the private capital stock less than capital taxation.
3.1.3 Consumption tax
The consumption tax has the broadest tax base of the three taxes since the
burden falls on all households: the infinitely-lived agent, as well as the young
and the old overlapping-generations agents are taxed. Financing public capital
with a consumption tax has the following effects:
1. Output is maximized for a tax rate of > 90 %.
2. The policy is Pareto-improving for consumption taxes up to more than
90 % (see Figure 3 on the right).
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3. Both households prefer a consumption tax > 90 % (see Figure 3 on the
right).
4. Dispersion in all three variables changes only slightly (see Figure 3 on
the left).
dY(%) duILA(%) duOLG (%) dσK (%) dσu (%) dσInc (%)
τmaxY > 0.9 221.3 91.4 92.6 −0.3 −1.4 −0.7
τmaxu,ILA > 0.9 221.3 91.4 92.6 −0.3 −1.4 −0.7
τmaxu,OLG > 0.9 221.3 91.4 92.6 −0.3 −1.4 −0.7
Table 4: Steady-state effects of a consumption tax-financed increase in public
spending. In the column on the left, the levels of consumption tax rates which
maximize output and utility of the different agents are given. In the remaining
columns the changes in output, welfare and dispersion are given in percent, as
compared to the baseline. Some values are outside the feasible range of taxes
in our model and are thus marked with a “>” sign.
Figure 3: Effects of consumption tax-financed public capital on the dispersion
of wealth, welfare and income (left side) and on the welfare of both agents
(right side).
Consumption tax-financed public capital acts on the distribution in three
ways: (i) The burden of the consumption tax itself falls on all agents (young/old
OLG agent and ILA). However, the young OLG agent can react to the tax
by adjusting its labor supply. For the other agents, leisure is assumed to be
constant. A reduction in leisure reduces the leisure component in the utility
function but potentially increases income due to more hours worked. (ii) Pub-
lic capital entering the production affects all agents via increased factor prices
(in the short run). In order to maintain the interest rate at its Pasinetti level,
the high income household has to decrease its savings rate relative to that of
the middle income household. The long-run wage rate remains at increased
levels in the steady state, which leads to an increased steady-state income and
increased saving for the middle income household. (iii) Public capital enter-
ing the utility function increases both agents’ utility obtained through leisure.
Only the young OLG agent has an endogenous labor-leisure choice and can
react to increased public spending. For the standard calibration, an increase
in public capital leads to a decrease in leisure (see also equation C.5), which
leads to an increased income.
In sum these effects lead to the following outcome: The leisure-reducing
effect of public capital (iii) outweighs the direct effect of the consumption tax
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(i) by far, so the leisure of the young OLG agent decreases. For the standard
calibration and the parameter variations given in Table 7, the increase in the
high and the middle income households’ income is almost of the same size, so
the resulting difference in the income, wealth and welfare distribution are very
small and this policy appears almost distribution-neutral.10
Consumption tax financing always increases efficiency up to very high tax
rates, since the Pasinetti property of the model ensures high capital accumula-
tion, which has a positive effect on wages. Both agents steady-state income is
then increased. Even though the agents’ consumption decreases at some point,
the utility-enhancing effect of public capital more than compensates for this
loss. For that reason all agents prefer consumption tax levels up to 90 %.
3.1.4 Summary: Comparing the different taxes
In our model tax-financed public capital acts on the distribution in three differ-
ent ways: First, through a change in the policy, the aggregate level of capital
changes. Second, agents are affected differently by different tax instruments
and finally, agents react to policies by changing their leisure level and their
saving behavior. Since all taxes differ in their impact on aggregate capital,
in their differential impact on the households and on the labor-leisure choice,
each tax has different effects on equity and efficiency.
When comparing the results from Tables 2, 3 and 4, two main differences
become apparent:
(i) The dispersion in all variables is strongly reduced by capital tax financing
of public spending, while labor tax financing increases it. A consumption
tax hardly changes the dispersion in all variables.
(ii) A consumption tax enhances the economy’s output the most for a tax
rate up to 20 %. Above that threshold a labor tax outperforms the con-
sumption tax, while a capital tax performs worst. We attribute this to the
disincentive to accumulate capital caused by the capital tax. For higher
tax levels aggregate efficiency is highest for labor taxation, since labor
taxation in this setup reduces leisure time thus causing middle income
households to work more and thereby increasing the public capital stock.
(i) and (ii) together suggest an equity-efficiency trade-off between inequality-
reducing capital tax financing and efficiency-enhancing consumption tax fi-
nancing.
By contrast all taxes constitute a Pareto improvement up to a certain tax
rate. This result depends crucially on the base level of public capital. When the
public capital stock is already at its optimal level, further investment does not
enhance both agents’ welfare and thus will not lead to a Pareto improvement.
The fact that the optimal tax rates (and with it the optimal levels of in-
frastructure provision) differ between the households has an important con-
sequence for an optimizing government: Providing infrastructure beyond the
10Consumption tax financing can be slightly regressive or progressive, conditional on the role
leisure plays in the utility function: Depending on the leisure endowment of old middle income
households lo and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution σIntra, the change in dispersion
varies between [−4.7%,2.3%] for the parameter ranges of these variables examined in the sen-
sitivity analysis (see Table 7). Nevertheless these distributional effects are still more than an
order of magnitude smaller when compared to the other financing mechanisms. See Section
4.2.2 for details on the sensitivity analysis.
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optimum of one of the two classes, always involves a trade-off between the
welfare of the different classes, at least for capital and labor tax financing. For
those financing instruments, further normative assumptions would be neces-
sary to determine the optimal tax level. Those normative assumptions can be
avoided if infrastructure is financed via consumption taxes: For this case the
trade-off between the middle and the high income household disappears since
both agents prefer the same tax rate.
3.2 Transitional dynamics
In addition to the steady state analysis we also analyze the transitory dynamics
of the system, since short-run distributional effects can go into opposite direc-
tions than long-run effects. We examine the impact of an unanticipated policy
shock: When the system is in a steady state, public spending is increased from
the baseline level to a level which increases output by 30 %.
We find two main results: (i) Short-term effects opposite to the long-run
outcome are found only in the case of labor taxation: Wealth inequality is de-
creased in the short run, but then converges to a steady state with increased
wealth inequality (see Figure 9 in Appendix A). (ii) A consumption tax has
almost no long-run effects on the distribution, but strong short-run effects.
Wealth inequality is decreased while income inequality is strongly increased
in the short run (see Figure 4). The dynamics for a capital tax are displayed in
Figure 10, which can be found in Appendix A.
Short-term effects for both labor and consumption can be explained as fol-
lows. The slight initial decrease in the wealth distribution can be attributed to
the Pasinetti property of the system: A sudden increase in public spending in-
creases both factor prices, thus saving of both agents increases. Since the high
income household wants to force the interest rate back to the Pasinetti level,
she decreases her saving. Wealth inequality is then reduced until the interest
rate converges to the Pasinetti level, determined by high income household’s
time preference rate. The strong reaction of the income distribution for a la-
bor and a consumption tax can also be explained by the Pasinetti Paradox:
A sudden increase in public spending increases both factor prices. Since the
interest rate before the shock is already at its Pasinetti level, the productivity-
enhancing shock causes the interest rate to converge to its steady-state levels
from above, while the wage rate converges to its steady-state levels from be-
low. This leads to higher capital income than wage income in the short run and
thus to increased income inequality. This effect is not visible at the moment of
the shock, t = 0, since the savings level of the middle income household has
already been determined in the time step preceding the shock.
In the case of capital taxation (see Figure 10, Appendix A) dispersion in
all variables converges to its steady-state value without noteworthy short-run
effects except for the strong initial decrease in the income dispersion which
accrues to the fact that middle income households determine their savings in
the period before the shock.
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Figure 4: Transitory effects of an unanticipated increase of the consumption
tax from the baseline steady state to a new steady state. The new steady state
has a 30 % higher output level than the baseline. Even though the long-run
effects of consumption tax-financed public investment are almost distribution-
neutral, there are strong short-run effects.
4 Extensions and robustness
This section consists of two main parts. In Subsection 4.1, we present three ex-
tensions to the model: the case of endogenous growth, lump-sum tax-financed
public spending and debt-financed public spending.
An extensive discussion of the robustness of our findings is presented in
Subsection 4.2. We focus on both, the robustness across theories and assump-
tions (Subsection 4.2.1), as well as on the robustness across parameter values
(Subsection 4.2.2).
4.1 Extensions
4.1.1 Endogenous growth analysis
This section summarizes our findings from the endogenous growth version
of the model. It can be seen as the analogue to Section 3.1 for the case of
endogenous growth. In order to obtain constant instead of diminishing returns
in accumulable factors, we set β = 1−α (see Section 2.1). For this parameter
choice the economy converges to a steady growth path on which consumption
and capital for both agents, as well as output, public capital and the composite
externality grow at the same rate g.
The differences to the steady state analysis are mainly driven by the fact
that the Pasinetti Paradox does not occur in the case of endogenous growth (for
more details on the Pasinetti Paradox see Section 2.5). Along the growth path
we consider changes in the growth rate rather than in output as an indicator of
efficiency.
We obtain three main results: (i) Similar to the steady state analysis, con-
sumption tax-financed public investment is the most efficient policy, at least
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up to 20%, followed by a labor tax financing. Capital tax financing is the least
growth-enhancing policy (see Figure 5). (ii) Capital and labor taxation yield
results very similar to the steady state analysis, except for slight variations in
the case of low tax rates, which are explained below (Figure 6 a, b). (iii) The
results for a consumption tax deviate from the steady-state results (Figure 6 c).
This behavior is analyzed in detail below.
Figure 5: Effects of public investment on the steady-state growth rate: A con-
sumption tax is the most growth-enhancing way to finance infrastructure in-
vestment, directly followed by a labor tax. A capital-tax is the least growth-
enhancing policy instrument. Growth reaches its maximum already at a 30 %
capital tax, while the other taxes enhance growth up to their maximum levels.
For labor tax rates up to 20 %, income and welfare dispersion increase as
in the steady state analysis (see Figure 6 b). But wealth dispersion slightly
decreases, an effect which we only obtain because public capital is very pro-
ductive in the case of endogenous growth. This outcome can be explained by
examining the effects of an increase in labor tax-financed infrastructure spend-
ing:
(1) Leisure (lt) decreases because the quality of public capital is enhanced,
while total capital increases. This leads to a decreased interest rate and an
increased wage rate (see Equations 3 and 4).
(2) Public capital and thus the composite externality is increased, which en-
hances both the interest and the wage rate.11
(3) Combining both (1) and (2) leads to increases in both factor prices since
effect (2) outweighs effect (1) for the interest rate. However it also leads
to an increased ratio of wage rate to interest rate due to effect (1).
For small tax rates the productivity-enhancing effect of public capital more
than offsets the negative effect of taxation and due to (3), the middle income
11An effect unobserved in the case without endogenous growth, in which the interest rate
always stays at the level determined by the high income households’ time preference rate due
to Pasinetti’s Paradox.
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Figure 6: Effects of infrastructure financing through (a) capital, (b) labor and
(c) consumption taxation on the dispersion of wealth, welfare and income for
the case of endogenous growth. The downward spikes in Panel (a) reflect the
points where middle income households are equal in a certain variable to high
income households. For even higher tax rates the dispersion increases again,
but this time the middle income households are better off.
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households’ savings are affected more strongly by labor tax-financed public
spending than the high income households’ savings.12
For tax rates below 8 %, effect (2) is also at work in the case of a capital
tax, which leads to a small increase in income dispersion (see Figure 6 a).
From 8 % on the negative effect of capital taxation outweighs this effect. Both
of these effects are quite small for our current parameterization.
Consumption tax-financed infrastructure investment leads to a decreased
wealth dispersion, but to an increase in income dispersion for taxes up to 10 %.
For higher consumption taxes the income dispersion declines as well. There is
hardly any effect on welfare dispersion (Figure 6 c).
The mechanisms of an increase in the consumption tax are the same as for a
labor tax, so (1) to (3) still hold. But the negative effect of labor taxation on the
middle income households’ income is missing, so for tax rates above 10 %, the
middle income households’ income is affected more strongly by infrastructure
spending than the high income households’ income and thus income dispersion
declines from this point on. For tax values below 10 % the strong productivity-
enhancing effect of infrastructure investment causes the capital component of
the income to increase more strongly than the labor component, which leads
to an increase in the income dispersion.
4.1.2 Lump-sum tax financing
A lump-sum tax provides a meaningful benchmark, but it is not a feasible
policy instrument in real-world politics. We introduce the case of lump-sum
tax-financed public spending to exclude the distortive effects the other taxes
have on the economy. This allows to decouple to the distributional effect of
public spending from that of its financing.13
When the model converges to a steady state we find that lump-sum taxes
distort the economy far less than the other tax mechanisms and therefore lead
to the highest output levels (770 %, see Table 5).
dY(%) duILA(%) duOLG (%) dσK (%) dσu (%) dσInc (%)
τmaxY = 0.82 770 92.8 93.1 −50.7 −0.3 −90.1
τmaxu,ILA = 0.58 528.7 95.6 95.0 −36.9 1.2 −81.0
τmaxu,OLG = 0.56 509.9 95.6 95.0 −35.8 1.1 −78.6
Table 5: Steady-state effects of a lump-sum tax-financed increase in public
spending. In the column on the left, the levels of lump-sum tax rates which
maximize output and utility of the different agents are given. The remaining
columns display the changes in output, welfare and dispersion in percent, as
compared to the baseline. The lump-sum tax is given in percentage of output.
12This effect is not visible in the income dispersion since the labor component of the middle
income households’ income benefits less from labor tax-financed infrastructure spending than
the capital component due to the negative impact of the labor tax. The overall effect is that
the middle income households’ income benefits less from infrastructure spending than the high
income households’ income.
13We implement the lump-sum tax such that each household pays the same amount in per
capita terms. Since high income households only make up 5 % of the population, middle
income households make up 55 % and low income households are not included, high income
households end up paying 1/12 of the lump-sum tax, while middle income households pay for
the remaining 11/12.
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Figure 7: Effects of lump-sum tax-financed public investment on the disper-
sion of wealth, welfare and income (left side) and on the welfare of both agents
(right side).
Concerning the distributional effects in the steady state (see Figure 7, left),
welfare inequality is slightly increased while wealth and income inequality
decrease. Those distributional effects are a consequence of the Pasinetti prop-
erty of the model: The interest rate remains at the level of the high income
household’s time preference rate, even though increased public spending and
increased working hours have an increasing effect on both factor prices. The
only control variable for the high income household to maintain the interest
rate at its Pasinetti level is its saving, which is thus reduced compared to the
middle income household’s saving, which leads to decreased wealth and in-
come inequality. Welfare inequality remains almost unchanged, since the mid-
dle income household’s welfare increase that occurs through increased income,
is offset by its leisure reduction. As in the case of capital and labor tax financ-
ing, there is a difference between the tax rates that maximize output and those
that maximize welfare of the different households (see Table 5 and Figure 7,
right).
Figure 8: Transitory effects of an unanticipated increase of the lump-sum tax
from the baseline steady state to a new steady state (in which the lump-sum
tax amounts to 10 % of the economy’s output).
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The distributional effects in the transition to the steady state are displayed
in Figure 8. While welfare inequality converges smoothly to its steady-state
levels, inequality in income and wealth converge less smoothly: Through the
initial productivity-enhancing effect of public capital both factor prices in-
crease, which causes the high income household’s income to rise faster than
that of the middle income household, so income inequality is increased in the
first timesteps after the shock. In the following timesteps the interest rate con-
verges to its steady-state rate from above, while the wage rate converges to its
steady-state level from below. This causes income inequality to decrease, even-
tually below its initial level. Wealth inequality decreases strongly in the begin-
ning, since the high income household’s only reaction to high interest rates is
to decrease its saving relative to the saving of the middle income household.
With the interest rate returning to its Pasinetti level, the wealth distribution
converges to its steady-state level from below. Figure 8 considers an increase
in the lump-sum tax from 0 to 10% of output. 14
4.1.3 Public debt
Since government debt is frequently observed as a means for financing public
investment in the real world, we summarize the results of an analyis on the dis-
tributional effects of debt as a financing mechanism in this section. We conduct
an experiment in which we compare the transitional dynamics of consumption
tax-financed public spending with the dynamics when public spending is fi-
nanced via debt, with a consumption tax used for debt servicing. The detailed
analysis is available from the authors upon request.
We find that, apart from a strong progressive effect in the first period after
the shock, debt financing does not smooth the distributional curves in the tran-
sition to the steady state, it even increases short-run variations. Furthermore,
if debt is serviced by a consumption tax, long-run inequality is increased. This
result hints at the fact that government bonds have a regressive effect, since we
have shown in Section 3.1.3 that financing public spending via consumption
taxes is distribution-neutral.
We limit ourselves to the reduced experiment described above, since a full-
scale analysis of the equity and efficiency effects of government debt with all
the model variations observed in Sections 3 and 4.1.1 would go beyond the
scope of this article.15
4.2 Robustness
In this subsection we give further insights on the robustness of our results
across theories and model assumptions (Subsection 4.2.1) and we summarize
the results of an extensive sensitivity analysis (Subsection 4.2.2).
14Looking at a tax that increases output by 30%, as we did for capital, labor and consumption
taxation in Section 3.2, only leads to a lump-sum tax of 0.0162% of output. For this tax level
the distributional effects are not pronounced enough for displaying them graphically. We thus
decided to rather fix the total amount of revenue to be raised and to set the lump-sum tax
accordingly.
15Further interesting experiments would include relaxing the assumption that both middle
and high income households have access to the same type of government bonds, or the as-
sumption that debt is serviced after one period, investigating other channels for debt servicing,
or considering the case of externally held debt (to exclude the capital accumulation-reducing
effect of internally held debt).
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4.2.1 Theoretical robustness
Our model is distinguished from previous work on the subject by assuming
more sources of household heterogeneity: heterogeneous saving behavior (dy-
nastic vs. life cycle), income sources and heterogeneous time preference rates.
Although we believe that all these sources of heterogeneity are necessary to
explain observed wealth disparities in industrialized countries (Cagetti and De
Nardi, 2008; De Nardi and Yang, 2014), one may conclude that, from a theo-
retical point of view, this limits the scope of our analysis.
However, the major advantage of the structure of our model, combining
an infinitely-lived with an overlapping generations agent, is great robustness
in crucial modeling assumptions: While our main results are formulated in
a neoclassical growth framework, we demonstrate in Section 4.1.1 that the
results for labor and capital tax financing also hold for the case of endoge-
nous growth. Furthermore, our analysis is conducted with heterogeneous time
preference rates across agents. They seem to be the empirically realistic case
(Dynan et al., 2004; Green et al., 1996; Lawrance, 1991), but have not been
considered in previous work on the subject. Identical time preference rates are
just a special case, leading to no particular change in behavior in our model (in
Section 4.2.2 we present the results of a numerical experiment on this).
Previous work on modeling household heterogeneity in a dynamic setting
that focused on initial endowments only, either chose endogenous growth mod-
els, i.e. constant returns to accumulable factors, or limited itself to the analysis
of the transition to the steady state. The reason is that in the neoclassical
growth model (i.e. decreasing returns to accumulable factors) with hetero-
geneity only in initial endowments and no further assumptions, the long-run
distribution is indeterminate, in the sense that every possible distribution of
capital is consistent with the steady state (Becker, 2006).16 Heterogeneous
time preference rates in the neoclassical model however lead to a steady state
in which the agent with the lowest time preference rate owns all capital in the
long-run, while less patient agents immediately consume all of their income
and thus lead a “working poor” existence (Becker, 1980, 2006). We are only
aware of one article that analyzes the case of heterogeneous time preference
rates in an endogenous growth model, but this article has a somewhat different
focus: Angyridis (2015) analyzes the equity and growth impacts of budget-
neutral fiscal policy reforms when the government has access to non-linear
income taxes. This discussion is summarized in Table 6.
To summarize, our model is both narrower (in the sense that more assump-
tion on heterogeneity are made) and broader (in the sense of more robustness
across growth theories) depending on one’s viewpoint, when compared to pre-
vious work. Whether one considers this an improvement depends on whether
one views the further assumptions on household heterogeneity as increasing
realism (while maintaining modeling flexibility) or as needlessly sacrificing
parsimony. In any case, the previous discussion shows that our model does not
16Chatterjee (1994) points out that in the case of imperfect capital markets, in which each
household invests in its privately owned firm, the distribution in the long run would be com-
pletely equal, since capital poor agents would get higher rates of return on capital. This is
also the mechanism behind the long-run outcome in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). Chatterjee
(1994) furthermore demonstrates that assuming perfect capital markets can also lead to a deter-
minate steady-state distribution, if households are assumed to have consumption levels above a
positive minimum threshold (which leads to different savings rates across households).
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Endogenous growth Neoclassical growth
Identical ρ Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) Glomm and Ravikumar (1994)
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) Section 4.2.2
Heterogeneous ρ Angyridis (2015) Section 3.1
Section 4.1.1
Table 6: Selected literature on the equity and efficiency effects of public in-
vestment, with and without heterogeneity in the time preference rate ρ across
households in neoclassical and endogenous growth models. Our contributions
are indicated by the section numbers of this article. Note that in our model it
is technically possible to also contribute to the first quadrant of this table (en-
dogenous growth with identical time preference rates), but this experiment is
excluded for brevity.
nest previous models but provides an independent alternative to exploring the
impact of household heterogeneity on the effects of public investment.
4.2.2 Robustness across parameters
We find that our results from Section 3.1 do not change qualitatively in all of
the scenarios described in Table 7. Furthermore, the results for capital and
labor tax financing are very robust and are valid even beyond the parameter
ranges given in this table. A detailed sensitivity analysis on which Table 7 is
based is available from the authors upon request. The three most important
results can be summed up as follows:
(i) For β = 0 a Pareto improvement is still possible even though the com-
posite externality is only utility-enhancing. (ii) In the case of θ = 0, in which
the composite externality is only production-enhancing we also have the possi-
bility of Pareto-improving policies. This means that our results do not depend
on whether the composite externality affects production or utility, as long as
it affects one of them positively. (iii) The results are robust in ε and ϕ which
means that they also hold with a Romer (1986) and a Barro (1990) type of
representation of the roles of public and private capital. Thus our assumption
about household heterogeneity is the main driver of all observed effects.
Symbol Parameter Range
β Exponent of Xp,t in production [0,0.4]
(ε,ϕ ) Exponents in composite externality (0,1), (0.6,0.6), (1,0)
lh Leisure high income household [0,1]
lo Leisure old middle income household [0.6,1]
ρh = ρm Equal time preference rates (yearly) 1.2%
θ Share of leisure in utility function [0.0,3.5]
σIntra Intratemporal elasticity of substitution [0.6,1.2]
Standard CES utility ut =
(1
b
)(
(1−θ )Cat +θ (Xu,t lt )a
)( b
a
)
, θ = 0.5
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis of the model. The character of the results does
not change for these parameter variations.
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5 Conclusion
The present article studies the effect of public investment on equity and ef-
ficiency. We introduce a concept of household heterogeneity that is based
on stylized facts about empirical saving behavior and differences in income
sources and time preference. We make two main contributions:
First, we find that in the long run, capital tax-financed public investment
can enhance the total levels of wealth, welfare and income up to a certain tax
rate and, at the same time, reduces inequality in these economic variables.
Consumption tax financing also enhances productivity but leaves inequality in
wealth, welfare and income virtually unaffected in the long run. This demon-
strates that for these two financing mechanisms there is a tax range in which no
equity-efficiency trade-off exists for the financing of public capital. We only
find such a trade-off in case of labor tax financing since taxing labor income in-
creases inequality but enhances the total levels of wealth, welfare and income
(up to a certain level). We also compute the optimal tax levels for all three fi-
nancing possibilities and find that agents differ in their preferred level. In sum,
these results show that our assumptions about household heterogeneity lead to
conclusions on the equity impacts of public investment that partially confirm
and partially differ from previous work on the subject: Differences concern the
case of consumption tax financing (for all inequality indicators) and capital tax
financing, when wealth and welfare are considered as inequality indicators.
Second, the type of model examined in this article yields very robust re-
sults with regard to the modeling assumptions. The results neither depend on
the assumption of homogeneous time preference rates across households nor
on the assumption of endogenous growth.17 Concerning the role of private
and public capital in production, the results remain qualitatively the same if a
Romer (1986), a Barro (1990) or an intermediate formulation is chosen, and
they do not dependent on the dual role private and public capital play in pro-
ductivity and utility, as long as it affects one of the factors positively.
We find that the equity and efficiency impacts of public investment are
highly sensitive to the way heterogeneity is modeled. In the light of these find-
ings, we agree with Diamond and Saez (2011), who, in a recent article on the
policy relevance of modeling results, argue that “we should view with suspi-
cion results that depend critically on very strong homogeneity or rationality
assumptions” (p. 166). We thus conclude that a proper analysis of the equity
and efficiency effects of public policies should take into account differences in
household characteristics which are beyond initial endowments.
The modeling presented in this article could be extended to assess addi-
tional questions of public policy, for example climate policy, health spend-
ing or pension systems. A further refinement of the model structure could be
to include mobility between income classes similar to García-Peñalosa and
Turnovsky (2015), the transmission of human capital within families as in
Becker and Tomes (1986) and the existence of public insurance schemes as,
for instance, in Meijdam and Verbon (1997). Optimal policies could be derived
by introducing an optimizing government with different welfare functions, in
order to evaluate the implications of different welfare norms on equity and
efficiency of the economy.
17Only the results for consumption tax financing are sensitive to the assumption of endoge-
nous growth.
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Appendices
A Transitional dynamics for a labor and a capital tax
Figure 9: Transitory effects of an unanticipated increase of the labor tax from
the baseline steady state to a new steady state. The new steady state has a 30 %
higher output level than the baseline. Even though the long-term effect of labor
tax-financed public investment is inequality-increasing, it decreases short-term
wealth inequality.
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Figure 10: Transitory effects of an unanticipated increase of the capital tax
from the baseline steady state to a new steady state. The new steady state has a
30 % higher output level than the baseline. For the case of capital tax financing,
the model approximates the steady state monotonically, except for a strong first
period decrease in income inequality, which can be attributed to the fact that
middle income households choose their saving level in the period before the
shock, whilst the high income households choose their level of saving already
anticipating the shock.
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B First-order conditions high income households
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem of the high income households
can be written as:
L =
tfinal
∑
t=0
uILAt ·
1
(1+ρh)t
+λt
(
(1+ (1− τK )rt )Kh,t + (1+ τc)Ct −Kh,t+1
)
.
The first-order conditions of the high income household then are:
(1+ (1− τK )rt )λt = λt−1, (B.1)
∂uILAt
∂Ct
· 1
(1+ρh)t
= λt (1+ τc). (B.2)
Calculating the derivations in Equation (7) yields the explicit Euler equa-
tion: (
Cat−1 +θ (Xu,t−1lh)
a
)( b
a−1
)
(
Cat +θ (Xu,t lh)a
)( b
a−1
)
(
Ct
Ct−1
)(1−a)
=
1+ (1− τK )rt
1+ρh
(B.3)
C First-order conditions middle income households
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem of the middle income household
can be written as:
L = uOLGt −κt ·
(
Cy,t (1+ τc)+
(1+ τc)Co,t+1
(1+ (1− τK )rt+1) − (1− τw)wt (1− lt )
)
.
The first-order conditions are calculated as:
κt =
∂uOLGt
∂Cy,t
1
(1+ τc)
(C.1)
κt =
∂uOLGt
∂Co,t+1
(1+ (1− τK )rt+1)
(1+ τc)
(C.2)
(1− τw)wκt = ∂u
OLG
t
∂ ly,t
(C.3)
Combining Equations (C.1) and (C.2) we get the Euler equation (11). By
combining (C.1) and (C.3) we get Equation (12). By calculating the partial
derivatives of uOLGt and inserting them into Equation (11) and Equation (12)
we get the explicit expressions:
Co,t+1
Cy,t
=
((
1+ (1− τk)rt+1
(1+ρm)
)
·
(Cao,t+1 +θ (Xu,t+1lo)a
Cay,t +θ (Xu,t ly,t )a
)(( b
a
)−1)) 1(1−a)
(C.4)
Here we can see that only the intertemporal decision given by Equation
(C.4) is directly influenced by capital taxation, as this expression depends on
τk.
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ly,t
Cy,t
= X
a
(1−a)
u,t
(
θ · (1+ τc)
(1− τw)wt
) 1
(1−a)
(C.5)
By contrast, we infer from the second Euler Equation (C.5) that the intragen-
erational labor-leisure decision is only directly influenced by consumption and
labor taxation: the higher the labor or consumption tax, the higher the chosen
levels of leisure.
D Steady-state equations of the economy
By formulating the equations for the system’s steady state we can gain im-
portant insights about the main drivers of steady-state behavior. Additionally
we can verify if the dynamic model, which is solved numerically, is solved
correctly.
In the following all steady-state variables are denoted by a tilde. From
Equations (6) and (14) it is easy to obtain an expression for the ILA’s steady-
state consumption C˜:
C˜ = ρhK˜h. (D.1)
The middle income household’s first-order conditions (Equations 9, 10, C.4
and C.5) and the first-order conditions of the firm (Equations 3 and 4) remain
the same in the steady state.
The steady-state level of public capital K˜G is given by:
δGK˜G = τK · r˜K˜ + τw · h˜w˜+ τc · (C˜+C˜y +C˜o). (D.2)
Together with the Equation (2) we have a system of partially nonlinear
equations.
By combining the steady-state Equations (14), (D.1), (D.2) with the first-
order conditions of the OLG agent (9, 10, C.4, C.5) and the firm ( 3 and 4), we
can eliminate r˜, w˜ and C˜:
(1+ τc)C˜y = (1− τw)
(
(1−α )AK˜α) X˜βp (1− l˜y)(1−α )− S˜,
C˜o =
(1+ρh)
(1+ τc)
S˜,
C˜o
C˜y
=
( 1+ρh
1+ρm
)
·
(
C˜ao +θ (X˜ulo)a
C˜ay +θ (X˜u l˜y)a
)(( b
a
)−1)
1
(1−a)
,
l˜y
C˜y
= X˜
2a−1
(1−a)
u
θ · (1+ τc)
(1− τw)
(
(1−α )A
(
K˜
(1−l˜y)
)α)

1
(1−a)
,
ρh
(1− τK ) +δK = αA
(
(1− l˜y)
K˜
)1−α
X˜βp ,
and
δGK˜G =
τK
1− τK ·ρhK˜+τw · (1− l˜y)(1−α )A
(
K˜
(1− l˜y)
)α
X˜βp +τc · (ρhK˜h+C˜y+C˜o).
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For the sake of readability we did not insert the expressions for K˜ = K˜h+ S˜,
for X˜p = K˜ε K˜1−εG and for X˜u = K˜
ϕ K˜1−ϕG . Now we only have a set of six partially
non-linear equations in K˜h, S˜, K˜G,C˜y,C˜o and l˜y.
E Including the low income households
If low income households are included into the model calibration, 38 % of
total net wealth is jointly owned by low and middle income households while
62 % is owned by high income households. This leads to a slight shift in the
graphs on the distributional effects of public investment as displayed in Figure
11 (black lines depict the original calibration, red lines the calibration in which
low and middle income households jointly own 38 % of the capital stock): For
consumption tax financing hardly anything changes. However, the inequality-
reducing effect of capital tax-financed public investment is weakened a little
bit and the inequality enhancing effect of labor tax financing is increased.
We observe these effects since including the low into the middle income
class means lower per capita wealth, welfare and income levels and thus an
increased dispersion of these variables.
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Figure 11: The distributional effects of public investment for capital tax (top),
labor tax (middle) and consumption tax financing (bottom). The black lines
are the results with the standard calibration, in which high income households
(the top 5 %) own 62 % of total wealth and middle income households (the
next 55%) own the remaining 38%. The case in which low and middle income
households jointly own 38% of total wealth is displayed with red lines.
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